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Recently I have spent a significant amount of time studying
Chinese People’s Court judicial opinions in the corporate law and
securities regulation areas, and have come across examples of
extremely competent judicial work by the People’s Courts at all
levels. This in turn has pushed me to reconsider the goals and
trajectory of “judicial reform” outside of the usual focus—the
“vertical” social control/criminal law function—but still in the
broader context of China’s movement towards “rule of law” and a
desired “rule of law state.”
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Admittedly, it is the judicial function in the social control/criminal
law areas which attracts the most attention from Chinese and
foreign legal scholars and journalists—e.g., with respect to
judicial constitutional review, administrative law and review,
criminal law and criminal procedure, or mass torts that threaten
to conjure group political action and social instability. That focus
is entirely appropriate, for what we loosely understand as judicial
independence (against superior political or military power) and
the autonomy of the law (against political commands or shifting
policy, and as contrasted with raw instrumentalism) must be at
the core of anyone’s conception of rule of law. At the same time,
however, we must understand that the majority of the PRC
citizenry intersects with law and legal institutions “horizontally”
and at the apparently more mundane level of property and
contracts rights and expectations.
As scholars intent on understanding the development of “rule of
law” in contemporary China, we cannot therefore ignore entirely
how legal institutions function, day to day, in the corporate/
commercial/contract/property rights spheres, and most
importantly how they are perceived to function by civil actors
who have recourse to the same institutions for the settlement of
disputes, clarification of property and contract rights, and
enforcement of those rights—at least against other, horizontally
positioned, actors. Indeed, many of the rights described and
enforced in the commercial sphere—e.g., residential and
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The following is an extract from the statement delivered by
Michigan Law School Professor Nicholas Howson at the
inaugural “China-U.S. Rule of Law Dialogue” held at Beijing’s
Tsinghua University July 29-30, 2010, and convened by Tsinghua
Law Dean Wang Zhenmin and Harvard Law School Professor and
East Asian Legal Studies Director William Alford, and with the
support of the China-United States Exchange Foundation chaired
by C.H. Tung, first chief executive and president of the Executive
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
dialogue was organized as a private meeting between senior PRC
law professors and U.S.-based Chinese law specialists to discuss
China’s three decades-long legal reform program and progress
towards “rule of law” in the People’s Republic of China in all
areas of the domestic legal system.
Professor Howson addresses the Rule of Law Dialogue in Bejiing, with
Harvard Law Professor William Alford, the late Professor Betty Ho of the
University of Toronto and Tsinghua University (and a former visiting
scholar at Michigan Law), and Tsinghua Law School Dean Emeritus
Wang Chenguang.

commercial real estate, intellectual property, labor contracting,
family property, media and publication, etc.—may presently or in
the future be asserted against institutions which have that
present monopoly on political or coercive power. These claims
may thus be seen as embryonic identities of the more sensitive
civil and political rights understood to be at the core of “rule of
law.”
Let me be more concrete by citing two examples of what I think is
highly competent adjudication in contemporary China, culled
from publicly available judicial opinions. These examples, two
among thousands, will never be described in the pages of
Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], Caixin Magazine, the
New York Times, or Le Monde. Yet they reveal commendable
judicial action that is relatively common, and distinct from the
always fascinating stories of lack of judicial independence,
official corruption, summary procedure, coercive use of the legal
system and more that feature in the Chinese and foreign media.
A first case arose in Shanghai Municipality’s relatively distant
Baoshan District.1 In the opinion, the Shanghai Baoshan District
People’s Court (later upheld by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate
People’s Court) looked through a de jure “corporate” establishment
to understand a de facto “partnership” and to rule on the investing
participants’ rights accordingly. Disregarding form (and an

1
Zhang Qingzhao v. Zhang Wenhu, Shanghai Baoshan District People’s Court (2002); upheld on
appeal Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court (2004). Reproduced in Supreme People’s
Court China Practical Jurisprudence Research Institute, ed., 55:1 RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI
XUAN (2006), pp. 234-41.
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apparent Shareholders’ Agreement between the investors), the
Baoshan court ruled that the entity at the center of the dispute
was a kind of general partnership and ordered equal partner
distributions of the enterprise’s residual assets (instead of
different proportions of the company’s residual assets determined
by the participants’ notional “equity” investment). The Baoshan
Court did not base its ruling on the imperfect PRC Partnership
Enterprise Law or any other positive law, but what are understood
to be universal partnership law principles: Unless subject to ex
ante contract, partners share in the residual assets of the
partnership equally, regardless of their investment or contribution
to the partnership. This decision demonstrates a very high level of
technical insight and competence, which even many U.S. state
courts struggling to adjudicate close corporations might have had
difficulty implementing.

2
Lu Tong v. Henan Longxiang Construction Engineering Company Limited, In re: Henan Golden
Mango Property Company Limited, Zhengzhou Municipal Guancheng Hui Minority District
People’s Court (2007) guan min er chu zi No. 257; upheld on appeal Henan Provincial
Zhengzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2009) zheng min er zhong zi No. 718.

In these two cases we see something which might be considered
extraordinary in the PRC context: technical competence certainly,
but also the ability of Chinese judicial institutions to go beyond the
bounds of formal statute in crafting a legal characterization and
applying doctrine that vindicates important legal rights in a highly
sophisticated and justice-facilitating way.
Tom Ginsburg and Timira Moustafa have identified five primary
functions for judicial institutions in authoritarian political systems:
(i) social control and the containment of political opposition; (ii)
bolstering government “legitimacy”; (iii) support of administrative
compliance and coordination of competing functions; (iv)
facilitation of trade and investment; and (v) the provision of cover
for controversial policies. I understand the Ginsburg-Moustafa list
as somewhat partial and pessimistic. In fact, judicial institutions
in non-democratic or authoritarian societies do much more than
erect a Potemkin Village of purely symbolic decision-making and
convenient cover for oppressive political organization. This is
especially true as even politically unreconstructed societies
experience economic system transformation, putting property and
contract rights into the hands of low-level civil actors: contract
parties, residential property owners, shareholders, inheritance
beneficiaries, copyright owners, etc. One proof of this is the
degree to which citizens in China with no particular political
background, or assurance of a politically determined result,
continue to refer to “law” and formal judicial institutions for
remedies. We saw this in the strong appetite among individual
shareholders for remedies against false or misleading disclosure
in the securities markets between 1999 (after promulgation of the
form of China’s first Securities Law) and 2003 (when the Supreme
People’s Court permitted a limited private right of action against
issuers, controlling shareholders, underwriters and accountants in
such cases), and widely publicized cases discussed in the very
independent PRC financial press. Aggrieved investors continued to
push into the People’s Courts, in many cases knowing that the
defendants were actors with superior political and economic
power in Chinese society (not to mention significant power over
the judges in their locale). The fact that state institutions have
sought to limit this recourse—for instance, by excluding claims
against insider trading and securities manipulation, splitting large
plaintiff groups into smaller groups, restricting contingency fee
arrangements, or continuing to resist the introduction of the
class action mechanism—does not dilute the certainty of
demand-side interest in recourse to formal judicial institutions
in contemporary China.
The critiques leveled against China’s judicial institutions both in
China and from abroad are many. These criticisms include: lack of
technical competence; constrained political independence and the
burden of Party Committees; funding of local level courts—and
thus direct political control—by local level government (and Party)
institutions; direction from adjudication committees; the inability
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A second case comes from the city of Zhengzhou in Henan
Province,2 where the shareholder of a property development
company was permitted to initiate a derivative suit against a
contractor that had not performed on a construction contract
entered into with company. The problem in the case, for the
initiating plaintiff at least, was that the complaining shareholder
had not formally served the requisite demand on, or met with
refusal from, the development company (the true party in interest
in the derivative action) in conformity with Article 152 of China’s
2006 Company Law. The defendant and non-performing
construction contractor offered as one defense that “the plaintiff
has not exhausted all internal remedies in accordance with legal
stipulations,” referring to the lack of required demand or refusal.
However, both the Zhengzhou Municipal Guancheng Hui
Minority District People’s Court and the Zhengzhou Intermediate
People’s Court on appeal permitted the derivative action to go
forward by taking judicial notice of that fact that originally the
company did sue on the contract, but then withdrew its action
(under the power, no doubt, of the breaching or simply conflicted
fiduciary) at the time of the lower court proceedings. This allowed
both courts to rule that (in the words of the appellate Intermediate
People’s Court opinion) “this may be seen as the same thing as a
refusal [by the company] to bring the action.” This elegant
adjudication allowed the plaintiff and the courts to continue with
the derivative action for contract enforcement even in the absence
of legally required demand and refusal—a technical nonconformity which more timid or less autonomous courts would
have invoked as a basis to deny the entire claim.
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to act against local government (Party) power to enforce civil
rights and interests (not to mention central law or policy); relative
powerlessness against the police, secret police and military;
understaffing and over-stretched resources; procedural
irregularities and confusion (including endless appeals and “black
holes,” and failure to deliver resolution, compensation or any idea
of “justice”); unrestrained and judgment-determining ex parte
contacts; the continuing failure to hold public proceedings;
corruption; lower courts seeking guidance from bureaucratically
higher-level courts prior to decision; court officials working
towards bureaucratic quota of “case handling” (case disposition)
rather than substantive case-specific adjudication; refusal to
accept cases that involve a large number of parties (triggering
“social stability” [shehui wending] concerns); the drafting of
opinions prior to submission of briefs or trial, or by court officials
who have not attended case proceedings; enforcement “chaos” or
impotence, etc. These specific concerns have only been augmented
after 2007 by concern, again both Chinese and foreign, about a
seeming shift in the rhetoric emanating from the Supreme People’s
Court favoring a “democratic” (“masses”-friendly) judiciary, and
attacking a “professional” (and “mystifying”) judicial apparatus.
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The answers proposed—and in some cases implemented—to
this collection of concerns tend to focus on mechanisms designed
to enhance the People’s Courts’ technical competence,
professionalism, transparency, procedural regularity, and political
independence: (i) education, training, qualification and increased
professionalization of judicial personnel; (ii) the uncoupling of
local level courts from local governments and Party institutions,
bureaucratically, politically and financially3 (with Supreme People’s
Court officials advocating a federal court system with something
like “diversity jurisdiction,” allowing for case acceptance and
decision by disinterested judicial institutions); (iii) increased nonpolitical oversight, and investigation and prosecution of corruption;
and (iv) enhanced transparency in judicial action. As scholars of
Chinese law and judicial institutions, we must be heartened by
and approve of all of these measures. Indeed, they are measures
taken by societies all over the world to strengthen the performance
and legitimacy of the single most important institution necessary
to deliver “rule of law.” There are of course historical and political
complexities and obstacles specifically applicable to the huge and
widely differentiated nation we call the “People’s Republic of

3
I note that the Politburo endorsed a proposal by the Central Political-Legal Committee to
create central funding for all People’s Courts in November 2008 (see “Opinions of the Central
Political-Legal Commission on Several Issues in the Deepening of Reform in the Judicial
System and Work Mechanism”). This remains unimplemented as of this statement.
4
My idea of “strict” constitutional review is review, by a court or independent commission, of
the conformity of legislative acts and executive action with superior norms laid out in a
Constitution. At the present time this kind of review is not permitted under the PRC
Constitution of 1982 (as amended), although it is allowed, in limited circumstances, under the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, i.e., with respect to Hong Kong
SAR legislative norms that do not relate to the concerns of the Central People’s Government or
the relationship between the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong SAR. Of course,
administrative review has been a reality in the PRC since the promulgation of the 1989
Administrative Litigation Law.

China” as it has developed to the end of the first decade of the
second millennium. Those particular factors may counsel that we
urge authentic and deeply rooted implementation of the abovelisted reform measures before we push too hard for really
extraordinary changes like judicial “strict” constitutional review,4
ever more robust judicial review of administrative action, and the
like—favorites of Chinese legal reformers stretching back to the
(mostly) Western-educated stalwarts of the early 20th century.
Yet even with those specific factors in mind, let me suggest one
other idea for continuing development of China’s reforming judicial
institutions, and one that is inspired by my close review of judicial
opinions in the purely commercial sphere. It is an idea slightly
divorced from what we legal specialists usually advocate, i.e.,
substantive law reform, perfection of procedural rules, better
financing of litigation or courts, etc. We should work to continue
attracting “horizontal” dispute litigants into the PRC People’s
Courts and attempt to remove obstacles, structural, substantive or
applied, which keep those civil actors out of the courts, including
the direction of cases to assuredly resource-efficient mediation,
arbitration, or alternative dispute resolution. This proposed push
has many virtues aside from those identified by institutional
economists keen to show how predictably enforceable (and
enforced) property rights result in economic development, and
relates specifically to the task of constructing and reforming
China’s judicial institutions. I am convinced that increased use of
the People’s Courts in such cases would enhance the idea of such
judicial institutions as the best and most authoritative forum for
dispute resolution and property rights delineation (as opposed to
China’s very strong pre-existing institutions such as local Party
organizations, neighborhood committees, or family organizations).
It would also serve the sometimes quite inchoate expectations of
China’s population, who as noted above continue to look towards
formal legal institutions for remedies, even against state or Party
infringement of their rights and interests. But, and most importantly,
increased traffic in the People’s Courts on complex matters with
significant value at stake would give the courts themselves the
chance to function, apply the law intelligently (and flexibly),
demonstrate judicial independence, direct enforcement, and
buttress their legitimacy as the critically important institution of a
state governed “under law.” Of course, egregious mistakes will be
made, corruption will continue to work its poison, and there will be
vigorous resistance to increased judicial action from much stronger
political forces. Yet China’s judicial institutions will be functioning,
and seen to be functioning, with ever-increasing challenges to
their competence, autonomy and political independence, and in an
area of law and activity that does not impact directly on the
political or social control sphere or the center of governance
power. The hope is that if judicial institutions can establish
themselves in this limited area, then their social power,
effectiveness and legitimacy will extend to areas closer to the
more sensitive core of what we perceive to be the “rule of law.”
Thank you very much.

M .J. Mur awk a, Way ne State University

Progress and Pitfalls: Trade and Investment
Relations with China at Heart of Conference
A conference co-organized by the U-M Law School earlier this year
brought together a prominent contingent of experts on trade
relations and cross-border investment between the United States
and China who emphasized the opportunities and potential
conflicts as China rises to a global trade and investment power.

“The re-emergence of China … will be the biggest economic story
of this century, in my opinion,” she said. “It is both a cause for
marvel and a cause for significant global concern.”
The event, as conceived by U-M Law Professor Nicholas C. Howson
and Wayne State University Law Professor Julia Qin, featured a
public dialogue between the world’s top academic experts on
trade relations between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China, present and former government officials from
Beijing and Washington who have been tasked with negotiating
and implementing that important relationship, and the legal
professionals who represent the two nations (and in some cases
domestic petitioning groups) in actual disputes.

Howson said he and Qin were pleased to have gathered some of
the key figures involved in the U.S.-China relationship, including:
Ambassador Barshefsky; Madame Li Yongjie, the Chinese Ministry
of Commerce official in charge of all WTO disputes and resulting
litigation; Tim Stratford, a former director of the China Desk at the
U.S. Trade Representative; and Professor Merit Janow, who
recently stepped down from the WTO's Supreme Court equivalent,
the Appellate Body.
In addition to Professor Howson, U-M Law School also was
represented by Professor Edward Parson, who described the
present state of U.S.-China climate change negotiations. Other
U-M participants included Professor Mary Gallagher, director of
the U-M Center for Chinese Studies; Professor Zhao Minyuan of
the Ross Business School; and Professor Alan Deardorff of the
U-M Economics Department, who also serves as the associate
dean of the Ford Public Policy School.
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During a keynote address, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky,
President Clinton’s U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the
person who negotiated China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization spoke of increased head-to-head competition
between developed and developing countries generally, business
conditions in China that often are disadvantageous for foreign
companies, and a change in the global trade and capital markets
from U.S. dominance to a marked increase in China’s power and
influence.

One goal of the conference “was to focus the same high-powered
analysis and discussion on other aspects of the economic
relationship, including of course investment (going both ways) and
broader systemic concerns like the economics of international
trade and investment, climate change, the demands of the energy
industry, the rise of the Chinese currency, and domestic judicial
and enforcement institutions in both nations,” Howson noted.
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